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Blame is multifarious. It can be heated or sedate. It can be expressed or kept private. We blame 
both the living and the dead. And we blame ourselves as well as others. What’s more, we blame 
ourselves, not only for our moral failings, but also for our non-moral failings: for our aesthetic 
bad taste, gustatory self-indulgence, or poor athletic performance. And we blame ourselves both 
for things over which we exerted voluntary control (e.g., our voluntary acts) and for things over 
which we lacked such control (e.g., our fallacious beliefs, malicious desires, and irrational 
intentions).  
Unfortunately, though, many extant accounts of blame fail to do justice to the manifest 
diversity in our blaming practices. For instance, T. M. Scanlon holds that “to blame a person 
is…to take your relationship with him or her to be modiﬁed” (,//-, 0,-–1) and, as a 
consequence, “to alter or withhold intentions and expectations that that relationship would 
normally involve” (,/0V, -1). Yet, it seems clear that we can blame the dead without either 
taking our relationship with them to have been modiﬁed or altering our intentions with respect 
to them. Others—e.g., Miranda Fricker (,/0Z)—acknowledge blame’s manifest diversity but 
hold that, given this diversity, there can be no hope of providing illuminating necessary and 
suﬃcient conditions for blame. These philosophers hold that just as there’s nothing common to 
all instances of the word ‘game’, there’s nothing common to all instances of the word ‘blame’. 
They believe that the best that we can hope for is an account that speciﬁes the extension of 
‘blame’ in terms of suﬃcient resemblance to some paradigm, or in terms of what Ludwig 
Wi^genstein (01_V) called family resemblances. Still others—e.g., Angela Smith (,/0V)—think that 
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although the diversity in our blaming practices shouldn’t lead us to give up on the prospect of 
providing illuminating necessary and suﬃcient conditions, we should give up on trying to 
specify those conditions in terms of what’s constitutive of blame. For, as these functionalists see 
things, the only thing that unites all instances of blame is that they all play the same functional 
role.1  
I’m more optimistic about the possibility of providing an illuminating set of necessary 
and suﬃcient conditions that speciﬁes blame’s extension in terms of its constitution as opposed 
to its function. In what follows, I’ll propose just such an analysis. This proposal is stated and 
then clariﬁed in section 0. On this proposal, there are two conditions for blaming someone that 
are individually necessary and jointly suﬃcient. So, in sections , and V, I defend the necessity of 
each. And, in section b, I defend their joint suﬃciency. In section _, I go through all the disparate 
forms of blame and how my proposal can account for each of them. I, then, conclude in section 
Z with a summary of results along with an explanation of their importance.     
 
!. My Proposal for a Comprehensive Account of Blame 
To be blamed or praised for something is to be held responsible for it. But there are at least two 
ways of being responsible for something. One is to be the cause of it. This is causal responsibility. 
Another is to be accountable for it. And if one is accountable for something, then one can 
appropriately be held liable to reward or sanction for it. The reward or sanction needn’t come 
from the law, society, or common opinion, but it must at least come from the approval or 
disapproval of one’s own conscience—see Mill (0110, chap. _). And, to distinguish this from 
                                                        
1 Functionalists hold that blame is, in a certain respect, more like a mousetrap than a diamond (Polger ,/01). What 
makes something a mousetrap is not that it’s constituted in a certain way but that it has a certain function: that of 
trapping a mouse. By contrast, what makes something a diamond is not that it has a certain function but that it is 
constituted by carbon crystals with a certain molecular la^ice structure. On functionalist accounts, then, blame is just 
whatever has some particular function. But, like Dana Kay Nelkin (,/0f, -0Z), I doubt that our conception of blame is 
at bo^om a functionalist one. For it seems to me that some instances of blame have absolutely no function. Consider, 
for instance, someone who privately blames herself for some long-past misdeed only to die seconds later. I doubt that 
such instances of blame have any function, even an unfulﬁlled one. Indeed, it seems a category mistake to suppose 
that such instances of blame are idle in the way that a mousetrap in a world of no mice is.    
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causal responsibility, I’ll call it normative responsibility.2 It’s important to distinguish these two, 
because one can be causally responsible for something without being normatively responsible 
for it. I can, for instance, be causally responsible for spreading a virus at work even if I’m not 
normatively responsible for doing so given that I had no idea that I was infected.  
My aim in this paper is to provide an account of normative as opposed to causal blame.3 
In the remainder, though, I’ll leave the ‘normative’ qualiﬁer implicit.  
 
My Proposal: For any action φ, any subject S, and any potential target T (where T may or 
may not be identical to S), S blames T for having seemingly φ-ed if and only if both of 
the following conditions are met:  
• (Condition 0) S has some set of mental states that represents T (a) as having φ-ed, 
(b) as having violated a legitimate demand in φ-ing, and (c) as not having 
suﬀered all the guilt, regret, and remorse that she deserves to suﬀer in the 
recognition that she has violated this legitimate demand, and  
• (Condition ,) S feels, as a result of these representations, disapproval of, or 
disappointment in, T for having seemingly φ-ed.  
Additionally, the greater the amount of guilt, regret, and remorse that S represents T as 
still deserving to suﬀer, the greater the extent to which S blames T.4  
                                                        
2 The type of responsibility that contrasts with causal responsibility is more often called moral responsibility, but given 
that we can (or so I’ll argue) have this sort of responsibility with respect to violations of non-moral demands, the 
‘moral’ qualiﬁer can be quite misleading. For this reason, I’ve chosen to borrow Rik Peels more apt phrase normative 
responsibility (,/0f, 0Z). For someone who shares my worry about the more common phrase but adopts it anyway, see 
Hilary Bok (011-, 0,Vn.0). Also, as I see it, the relevant sort of responsibility is the one that’s conceptually tied to the 
desert of reward or sanction—that is, accountability as opposed to answerability or a^ributability. (See David 
Shoemaker (,/0_) for more on how these three diﬀer.) 
3 Praising or blaming a person for having φ-ed is just one way of holding her to account. Another way is to reward 
or punish her for having φ-ed.  
4 Although I won’t discuss the positive analogue of blame in detail, it’s an advantage of my account that it suggests 
the following symmetrical account: For any action φ, any subject S, and any potential target T (where T may or may 
not be identical to S), S feels gratitude—or whatever the positive analogue of blame is—toward T for having 
seemingly φ-ed if and only if both of the following conditions are met: (Condition 0) S has some set of mental states 
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This proposal is meant to be an account of what it is, in fact, to blame someone for 
having φ-ed. It isn’t meant to be revisionary. So, I’m not trying to ﬁgure out what blame would 
need to be for our blaming practices to be justiﬁed. Indeed, I’m interested in the correct account 
of blame partly because I’m interested in exploring in future work whether our blaming 
practices are justiﬁed even if it turns out that all our actions are causally determined. And 
depending on what the correct account of blame is, it will be more or less plausible to think that 
people can be blameworthy for acts that they were causally determined to perform. For if, on 
the one hand, blaming people involves merely evaluating them, then, given that evaluations can 
be accurate—and, thus, appropriate—regardless of whether the people being evaluated had 
control over the properties that make those evaluations accurate, there would be nothing 
problematic about blaming people for actions that they were causally determined to perform. 
But if, on the other hand, blaming people entails deliberately causing them to suﬀer, then, given 
that no one deserves to suﬀer in virtue of things over which they lacked control, it would be 
problematic to blame people for acts that they were causally determined to perform—at least, it 
would if we’re to assume that causal determinism rules out the sort of control that’s required for 
being deserving of suﬀering. 
 Fortunately, on my proposal, blame lies somewhere between these two extremes, such 
that blame goes beyond mere evaluative judgment but falls well short of necessitating the 
deliberate inﬂiction of suﬀering.5 On my proposal, blame must go beyond mere evaluative 
judgment in that it necessitates feeling disapproval of, or disappointment in, its target. Thus, it 
requires a change in one’s a^itude toward the target. And, so, there is, on my proposal, a 
                                                        
that represents T (a) as having φ-ed, (b) as having done what she ought to have done in φ-ing, and (c) as not having 
felt all the pride that she deserves to feel in the recognition that she has done what she ought to have done, and 
(Condition ,) S feels, as a result of these representations, approval of T for having seemingly φ-ed. 
5 Most agree with me in thinking that the correct account of blame must lie somewhere between these two extremes. 
See, for instance, Coates & Tognazzini (,/0V), Darwall (,/0/), Scanlon (,//-; ,/0V), Sher (,//Z), and Smith (,/0V). 
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distinction between blaming someone and merely making some set of judgments about her.6  
 But my proposal stops well short of insisting that blame must involve the deliberate 
inﬂiction of suﬀering. Thus, there is, on my proposal, also a distinction between blaming 
someone and punishing her. Since my proposal denies that blame requires taking any 
deliberate action, and since the deliberate inﬂiction of suﬀering necessitates deliberate action, 
my proposal allows that one can blame someone without punishing her. Indeed, on my 
proposal, blame essentially involves only two things: (0) a set of mental states that represent its 
target in various ways and (,) a feeling of disapproval of, or disappointment in, that target. And 
these are mental states, not deliberate actions.  
Beyond the fact that my account lies between the extremes of mere evaluative judgment 
and punishment, there are several other aspects of my proposal that need clarifying.  
First, the variable ‘φ’ ranges over non-voluntary actions as well as voluntary actions. For 
I’m using the term ‘action’ broadly to cover anything that’s “done” directly in response to 
reasons. This includes not only those things that we do at will (e.g., raising one’s hand to ask a 
question), but also some things that we do non-voluntarily, such as forming a belief, desire, or 
intention in response to reasons. Moreover, ‘φ’ ranges over omissions as well as actions. Indeed, 
the only things that ‘φ’ doesn’t range over are those things that can’t be done directly in 
response to reasons: e.g., fainting, digesting, and perspiring. And this is important because it 
seems that we can be blamed for things that we do non-voluntarily. For instance, it seems that I 
can appropriately be blamed for non-voluntarily forming the belief that taking vitamins causes 
an increase in longevity if I do so in response merely to learning that there’s a correlation 
between the two. 
Second, as I understand things, emotions such as guilt, regret, and remorse are 
inherently unpleasant. For, in feeling these emotions, we represent ourselves as having violated 
a legitimate demand while painfully appreciating the awful signiﬁcance of our having done so. 
                                                        
6 Thus, I concur with David Shoemaker in thinking that “blame involves a^itude adjustment (and not mere 
deployment of judgments)” (,/0V, 0/0).  
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So, if what we’re feeling is not painful, it can’t be guilt, regret, or remorse that we’re feeling.     
Third, when I speak of a ‘demand’, I’m speaking of a requirement as opposed to a mere 
expectation. Consequently, my account, as stated above, rules out the possibility /f someone’s 
being appropriately blamed for performing a ‘suberogatory act’ (Driver 011,)—that is, a 
permissible act that’s worse than some permissible alternative.7 Suberogatory acts may violate 
expectations but not requirements. To illustrate, my neighbor may not be required to refrain 
from mowing her lawn before 1 AM but it seems legitimate for me to expect her to so refrain. 
Now, some philosophers think that it’s appropriate for me to resent (and, thus, to blame) my 
neighbor for mowing her lawn before 1 AM even if she doesn’t violate any requirement in doing 
so.8 Personally, I ﬁnd this implausible, but there’s li^le point in debating the ma^er here. So, 
those who think it’s appropriate to blame people for performing suberogatory acts should just 
substitute ‘expectation’ for ‘demand’ throughout the above formulation.  
Fourth, as I see it, what makes a demand (or expectation) legitimate is just that it is 
rationally authoritative such that there is decisive reason to comply with it. Thus, if we’re to 
assume that morality is rationally authoritative and that act utilitarianism is the correct moral 
theory, it will be legitimate to demand that agents act always so as to maximize aggregate 
utility. And, of course, it could be legitimate to demand that an agent acts so as to maximize 
aggregate utility even if she wouldn’t be blameworthy for failing to do so. For she may have an 
adequate excuse, such as that her evidence misleadingly suggests that some other act would 
maximize aggregate utility. So, the sense of ‘legitimate’ at issue here is not one that necessitates 
that one would be blameworthy if one violated a legitimate demand, and this allows my 
                                                        
7 Another worry along these lines, suggested to me by Philip Swenson, is that someone can be blameworthy for 
always doing no more than the bare minimum. But I don’t think that this is an instance of someone’s being 
blameworthy for performing a suberogatory set of acts. Rather, I think that it’s an instance of someone’s violating the 
legitimate demand to do more than just the bare minimum required to fulﬁll all of one’s perfect duties. For it’s 
legitimate to demand that people also fulﬁll their imperfect duties (e.g., the duty of beneﬁcence), and these duties 
require us to do more than just the bare minimum needed to fulﬁll our perfect duties.   
8 See, for instance, Macnamara (,/0V, b_). Others are less sure about whether resentment is appropriate and are 
conﬁdent only that anger is appropriate—see, for instance, Shoemaker (,/0_, 1_). I concede that anger can be an 
appropriate response to the suberogatory, but whereas I accept that resentment is suﬃcient for blame, I deny that 
generic anger (as opposed to resentment or indignation) is.  
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proposal to avoid circularity. Also, I believe that it’s not just morality that can give rise to 
rationally authoritative demands. I believe that prudence can as well. And, perhaps, even 
athletic, aesthetic, and intellectual demands can become rationally authoritative if one makes 
these demands of oneself.      
Fifth, someone deserves something (say, X) if and only if, as a ma^er of justice and in 
virtue of her prior activities or possessed characteristics, she merits X in the sense that entails 
that the world in which she gets X and merits X in this sense is, other things being equal, non-
instrumentally be^er than the world in which she gets X but doesn’t merit X in this sense (cf. 
Feinberg 01f/, _-). Thus, one who claims, as I do, that the blameworthy deserve to suﬀer guilty 
feelings need not claim that it is overall non-instrumentally good that the blameworthy suﬀer 
guilty feelings. Rather, such a person need only claim that it is in some respect non-
instrumentally good that the blameworthy suﬀer guilty feelings such that it is, other things 
being equal, non-instrumentally be^er that the blameworthy suﬀer such feelings than that the 
non-blameworthy do. Also, note that the relevant sense of ‘merit’ here is not the one in which, 
say, Southwest Airlines merits a ﬁve-star customer-approval rating given its exceptional 
customer satisfaction. For even if Southwest Airlines does, in some sense, merit a ﬁve-star 
rating, it’s not in the sense that entails that the world in which Southwest Airlines gets a ﬁve-
star rating and merits such a rating in this sense is, other things being equal, non-instrumentally 
be^er than the world in which Southwest Airlines gets a ﬁve-star rating but doesn’t merit such 
a rating in this sense. For if it’s at all good that Southwest Airlines gets a ﬁve-star rating, it’s 
only instrumentally good in that in helps customers ﬁnd an airline with which they’ll be 
satisﬁed. After all, there is nothing inherently good about Southwest Airlines ge^ing a 
customer-approval rating that accurately reﬂects its degree of customer satisfaction. By contrast, 
there is, it seems, something inherently good about someone’s ge^ing what she deserves. 
Sixth, to have a mental state that represents its object as having a certain feature, one 
need not have the occurrent belief or thought that it has (or even that it seems to have) this 
feature. For imagine that while walking through the woods I have the perception of something 
slithering underfoot and immediately fear it, reﬂexively jumping up and out of its way. In this 
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case, my mental state—speciﬁcally, my fear—represents its object as a danger to me. And this is 
true even if there wasn’t enough time for this thought to enter into my consciousness. In this 
regard, I’m in complete agreement with Justin D’Arms and Dan Jacobson (,/0f; ,/01a; ,/01b). 
For we agree that to determine how a mental state of a certain kind represents its object we 
must ﬁrst do some empirical work to discover such things as what typically elicits mental states 
of this kind, what normally a^enuates them, what their phenomenology is like, what 
interpretation of their representational content rings true to those who possess them, and what 
sorts of act tendencies and pa^erns of a^ention are generally associated with them. Then, in 
light of this empirical data, we are to give an interpretation into natural language of how 
someone who possesses this kind of state represents its intentional object. This articulation of 
the representation will be propositional in its content such that a state of this kind will count as 
accurate in its representations if and only if the associated proposition (i.e., the proposition that 
its object has the features that it’s represented to have) is true. To illustrate, take fear. Fear is, I 
believe, best interpreted as the kind of mental state that represents its object as being a danger to 
its subject, for this is what makes most sense of the empirical data: (0) that those in the grip of 
fear dread what they fear, (,) that fear tends to focus one’s a^ention both on its object and on 
the means of avoiding or ge^ing away from it, (V) that fear is typically elicited by objects that 
are perceived to be a danger to its subject, (b) that fear tends to result in urgent action aimed at 
avoiding or ge^ing away from its object—or, at the very least, it results in physiological changes 
that readies one to take such action, and (_) that those under the grip of fear—including self-
aware phobics who know that what they fear isn’t dangerous—accept the interpretation that 
fear represents its object as a danger to oneself.9 And, if we accept this interpretation of how 
fear represents its object, a given instance of fear will count as accurate in its representations if 
and only if its object does indeed constitute a danger to its subject. So, on my proposal, a subject 
can count as blaming some target for having seemingly φ-ed even if she doesn’t have the 
                                                        
9 We should also appeal to such things in determining the intensity of the given mental state. Thus, one’s fear counts 
as more intense the greater one’s sense of dread, the more it tends to focus one’s a^ention both on its object and on 
ways of ge^ing away from it, the greater one’s tendency toward urgent action aimed at ge^ing away from its object, 
and the more dangerous that one takes that fear as representing its object as being.    
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occurrent belief or thought that this target meets sub-conditions a–c of condition 0. Rather, what 
needs to be true is only that the relevant empirical data suggests that the kinds of mental states 
that constitute blaming (e.g., guilt, resentment, and indignation) are best interpreted as 
representing their targets as meeting sub-conditions a–c.    
Seventh, a subject’s mental state can represent an object as having a certain feature even 
if she believes that it doesn’t have this feature. In other words, a mental state can be recalcitrant 
in that it stubbornly persists even in the face of an occurrent belief that its representations are 
inaccurate. To illustrate, consider the recalcitrant fear of ﬂying. This is where someone fears 
ﬂying despite judging that it poses no signiﬁcant danger to herself or others. This is possible, 
because although the fear of ﬂying necessitates representing ﬂying as a danger to oneself, it is 
compatible with the occurrent belief that this is inaccurate. And, given that a mental state can be 
compatible with the belief that its representations are inaccurate, it’s also possible for blame to 
be recalcitrant.10 That is, it’s possible for a subject to blame someone while simultaneously 
believing that the mental states constituting this are inaccurate in their representations of the 
target. To illustrate, consider the following real-life example. One morning early in our 
marriage, I noticed that my wife’s manner and behavior indicated that she was angry with me. 
Yet, when I pressed her, she denied it. But her strange manner continued and so my inquiries 
grew more insistent. Eventually, she admi^ed that she was feeling resentful toward me. As she 
explained, she had just woken up from a very vivid and seemingly real dream in which she had 
non-veridical perceptions of my cheating on her. And although she now realized that it was all 
just a dream, she still felt the same resentment that she had felt in her dream. For she still had 
the very vivid perceptual memories of my having seemingly cheated on her. And this made her 
feel like lashing out at me. Indeed, it seemed to her as if I deserved to suﬀer for what I had 
seemingly done. And this persisted despite her believing that I had done nothing to deserve to 
suﬀer. Thus, her mental states represented me as having violated a legitimate demand and as 
deserving to suﬀer guilt, regret, and remorse in the recognition of this despite her believing that 
                                                        
10 Proponents of the possibility of recalcitrant blame—or, at least, recalcitrant guilt, indignation, or resentment—
include Brady (,//1), Carlsson (,/01a), D’Arms & Jacobson (,//V), Gibbard (011/), McKenna (,/0,, Zf), Menges 
(,/0f, ,Z0), Pickard (,/0V), and Wallace (011b).    
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none of these representations were accurate. Her blame of me was, then, recalcitrant in the same 
way that many people’s fear of ﬂying is recalcitrant.  
  
:. The Necessity of Condition ! 
Having both stated and clariﬁed my proposal, I now need to defend it. For one, I need to defend 
the necessity of each of its two conditions. I’ll start with condition 0, which holds that a 
necessary condition for a subject’s blaming a target for having seemingly φ-ed is that she has 
some set of mental states that represents that target (a) as having φ-ed, (b) as having violated a 
legitimate demand in φ-ing, and (c) as not having suﬀered all the guilt, regret, and remorse that 
she deserves to suﬀer in virtue of her having violated this legitimate demand.11 There are, I 
believe, at least four reasons for thinking that this is a necessary condition for blame.   
7.9 The Empirical Data: One reason to think that blame must consist in a set of mental 
states that represents its target as meeting sub-conditions a–c is that this seems to oﬀer the best 
interpretation of the empirical data concerning the blaming emotions: guilt (where I blame 
myself), resentment (where I blame some other for transgressing me), and indignation (where I 
blame some other for transgressing a third-party). I take these three emotions to be paradigm 
instances of blaming, and, so, I take what’s true of them to be true of blaming in general.  
Let’s start, then, with the ﬁrst of the three: guilt. According to the psychological 
literature, what typically elicits feelings of guilt are self-perceptions of responsibility for an act 
that constitutes a transgression (Ortony et al. 01--; Tangney & Dearing ,//,), or what I’m 
referring to as the violation of a legitimate demand. And people who feel guilty typically 
                                                        
11 A close cousin to my view is Brendan Dill and Stephen Darwall’s accountability theory (,/0b). On their view, blame 
represents its target (oneself or some other) as having violated a legitimate moral demand without excuse. Their view 
will be especially close to my own if we assume, as I think we should, that all and only those who have violated a 
legitimate demand without excuse deserve to suﬀer guilt, regret, or remorse in the recognition of having violated that 
demand. But, unlike them, I don’t think that the demand in question needs to be a moral one. And, unlike them, I 
think that blame represents its target not only as having violated a legitimate demand without excuse, but also as 
deserving to suﬀer guilt, regret, or remorse in the recognition of having violated that demand—because there was no 
adequate excuse for doing so.        
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believe that they could and should have acted diﬀerently (Niedenthal et al. 011b). In this 
respect, guilt is unlike shame. For whereas guilt is typically elicited by unstable, controllable 
aspects of the self (i.e., transgressive acts), shame is typically elicited by stable, uncontrollable 
aspects of the self (speciﬁcally, those that fall below some standard and that could, 
consequently, result in a loss of honor, respect, or esteem).12 Similarly, when it comes to 
resentment and indignation, we ﬁnd that what typically elicits such emotions is the judgment 
that someone has been treated unjustly or otherwise wrongly (Mikula 01-Z; Shaver et al. 01-f; 
Prinz & Nichols ,/0/, 0,_). So, given that the blaming emotions are typically elicited by 
transgressive acts, my proposal interprets the blaming emotions as representing their targets as 
having performed an act that violates a legitimate demand.  
Admi^edly, some of the empirical data may initially seem problematic for my proposal. 
For, as Baumeister et al. (011b) point out, feelings of guilt can be elicited by the belief that one 
has undeservedly fared be^er than others, and these feelings arise even when one knows that 
one bears no responsibility for this unfairness. For instance, people often experience what’s 
known as survivor’s guilt when, by pure chance, they survive in a situation in which most 
others perished. But I think that we should understand survivor’s guilt either (disjunct0) as 
inaccurately representing surviving as something both that one “does” and that violates the 
seemingly legitimate demand not to enjoy inequitable beneﬁts or (disjunct,) as an entirely 
diﬀerent form of guilt that has nothing to do with blame. Indeed, some suggest that there are 
two distinct types of guilt: one that isn’t tied to blame and is elicited by the possession of 
inequitable beneﬁts and another that is tied to blame and is elicited by feelings of responsibility 
for a transgressive act (see, e.g., Prinz & Nichols ,/0/, 0Vb). In either case, my proposal ﬁts the 
data concerning the blaming emotions, which may or may not include survivor’s guilt 
depending on which of the above two disjuncts is correct.       
 Of course, my proposal also requires that blame (and, thus, the blaming emotions) 
involve(s) representing its target as not having suﬀered all the guilt, regret, and remorse that 
                                                        
12 See H. B. Lewis (01f0, V/); Niedenthal et al. (011b); M. Lewis (,///); Tangney & Dearing (,//,); and Tracy & 
Robins (,//Z).  
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she deserves to suﬀer. But this too is supported by the empirical data—speciﬁcally, by the data 
concerning the act tendencies associated with the blaming emotions as well as their palliators. 
Again, let’s start with guilt. Guilt is inherently unpleasant, yet we do not react to it as we do 
most other unpleasant experiences. When it comes to bodily aches, for instance, we’re typically 
motivated to take a pill to get rid of it. Or if there’s nothing we can do to get rid of it, we look to 
distract ourselves from it by taking our minds oﬀ it. Yet, guilt typically motivates us to focus our 
a^ention on it and its source (i.e., on our transgression and those who were adversely aﬀected 
by it) and to act in ways that will—at least, initially—aggravate it. Indeed, we’re often motivated 
to wallow in our guilt. Additionally, guilt motivates us to seek out those who we’ve 
transgressed so as to express our guilt, regret, and remorse to them. And this, typically, only 
inﬂames these feelings. Thus, guilty feelings tend to motivate us to act in ways that will, at least 
in the short term, aggravate them rather than alleviate them.13   
What’s more, we ﬁnd the idea of just taking a pill to rid ourselves of our guilt morally 
problematic. Admi^edly, some do turn to drugs or the bo^le to palliate their guilt. But this is 
not, we think, the best way to deal with our guilt. For this doesn’t so much rid ourselves of our 
guilt as merely momentarily dull it. To get rid of it, we must atone, repent, apologize, and make 
amends. Of course, sometimes transgressors don’t have the opportunity to make amends, 
express remorse, or even apologize. And, in such instances, the psychological research shows 
that those who feel guilty for a transgression are motivated to self-punish by inﬂicting physical 
pain or economic loss on themselves (Nelissen & Zeelenberg ,//1; Bastian et al. ,/00; Watanabe 
& Inbar et al. ,/0V; Ohtsubo et al. ,/0b; Tanaka et al. ,/0_).14 As Herbert Morris puts it, “the 
man who feels guilty often seeks pain and somehow sees it as appropriate because of his guilt. 
                                                        
13 I admit, of course, that in the long run these expressions of guilt, regret, and remorse can lead to our being forgiven 
by the transgressed and that this will then help to alleviate our feelings of guilt, regret, and remorse.  
14 The tendency that people who feel guilty have to punish themselves when they don’t have the opportunity to 
compensate the victims of their transgressions is what Nelissen and Zeelenberg (,//1) have labeled the “Dobby 
Eﬀect.” Ingar et al. also report that “a sizable experimental literature indicates that people often deal with their guilt 
over a bad deed by doing a good deed for someone else or for society in general” (,/0V, 0f). And, arguably, doing 
good deeds can help atone for one’s past bad deeds, making it such that one deserves to suﬀer less guilt, regret, and 
remorse than one once did.     
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…When we think of what it is to feel guilty then, we think…of something that is owed; and pain 
is somehow connected with paying what one owes” (01fZ, -1–1/). And it’s been shown that the 
guiltier one feels, the more severe the punishment one is likely to inﬂict upon oneself (Gintis et 
al. ,//0; Nelissen ,/0,; Watanabe & Ohtsubo ,/0,; Nelissen & Zeelenberg ,//1; Tanaka et al. 
,/0_). Likewise, resentment and indignation over a transgression motivates people to punish 
the transgressor. Indeed, people are willing to pay to punish a transgressor even if they know 
that they will never again interact with her and so will never recoup that cost (Fehr & Gächter 
,//,).15 And, as Gollwi~er and Denzler (,//1) have shown, people’s aim in inﬂicting such 
punishment is not solely to ensure that the transgressor suﬀers, for their research shows that 
people also want the transgressor to recognize that she’s been made to suﬀer because of her 
transgression. I believe that this is because they want the transgressor to recognize that they 
disapprove of what she has done and hope that she will come to share in their disapproval by 
feeling guilt, regret, and remorse. So, we ﬁnd both that guilt motivates punishment of the self 
and that resentment and indignation motivates punishment of the relevant other: the 
transgressor. Given this and the fact that the ultimate aim seems to be to induce guilt, regret, 
and remorse, it makes sense to interpret the blaming emotions as representing their targets as 
not having suﬀered all the guilt, regret, and remorse that they deserve to suﬀer.    
Further support for this interpretation comes from the fact that self-punishment palliates 
the blaming emotions. For instance, psychological research shows that self-punishment palliates 
feelings of guilt and that the more severe the self-punishment, the greater the palliative eﬀect 
(Bastian et al. ,/00; Inbar et al. ,/0V). As Morris observes, “feelings of guilt may disappear and 
the man [who used to feel guilty] may connect their disappearance with the pain he has 
experienced” (01fZ, 1/). Moreover, self-punishment palliates feelings of resentment and 
indignation in others, signaling to them that one is remorseful (Nelissen ,/0,). And this in turn 
encourages them to forgive (Zhu et al. ,/0f). And the more painful the punishment that one 
inﬂicts upon oneself, the stronger the eﬀect it has on the tendency of others to forgive (Zhu et al. 
                                                        
15 As Dill and Darwall point out, “several studies have shown that people are willing to punish at cost to themselves 
even in totally anonymous conditions, which oﬀer no opportunity for reputational gain or loss” (,/0b, bf).     
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,/0f). In general, it seems that what best palliates feelings of resentment and indignation is the 
judgment the transgressor has got her comeuppance (Prinz & Nichols ,/0/, 0,Z; Haidt et al. 
,/0/). Indeed, the psychological research suggests that what palliates these feelings is not 
rehabilitation or other happy endings, but only the transgressor’s suﬀering what she deserves to 
suﬀer (Prinz & Nichols ,/0/, 0,-; Haidt et al. ,/0/).16 And, here, I strongly suspect that the 
reason that the transgressor’s self-punishment palliates people’s resentment and indignation 
toward her is because they see her self-punishment as a sign of her guilt, regret, and remorse. 
For, in many of these experiments the transgressor self-punishes by leaving her hand in an ice-
water bath for a painfully long time. But I very much doubt that her doing so would palliate 
people’s resentment and indignation toward her if they believed that she was doing so only to 
prove how tough she was rather than doing so as a result of her feelings of guilt, regret, and 
remorse. Indeed, as Brendan Dill and Stephen Darwall have pointed out, “one of the most 
robust ﬁndings from [the psychological] research on forgiveness is that forgiveness usually 
occurs when and only when the perpetrator has adequately demonstrated remorse by 
acknowledging guilt, apologizing, and/or oﬀering compensation” (,/0b, b/).      
Given all the empirical data showing that the blaming emotions motivate people to 
punish with the aim of ge^ing the transgressor to hold herself accountable and to punish in 
proportion to the felt intensity of these emotions, and given all the empirical data suggesting 
that the transgressor’s suﬀering guilt, regret, and remorse both palliates these blaming emotions 
and promotes forgiveness, it seems best to interpret the blaming emotions as representing their 
targets as not having suﬀered all the guilt, regret, and remorse that they deserve to suﬀer. And 
this along with the empirical data concerning the elicitors of these emotions suggests that blame 
represents its target as meeting sub-conditions a–c of condition 0.    
                                                        
16 See Dill & Darwall (,/0b, bZ–_,) for citations to numerous studies showing that what motivates us to reproach, 
sanction, or punish someone for violating a legitimate demand is not the hope of that this will bring about some 
happy result such as deterrence or self-beneﬁt. Rather, we reproach transgressors in order to get them to hold 
themselves accountable for their transgressions, and they do this by feeling guilt, regret, or remorse in the recognition 
that they have violated a legitimate demand.         
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7.7 The Pro Tanto Permissibility of Deliberately Guilting the Blameworthy: Another reason to 
think that condition 0 is necessary for blame is that it provides the most plausible explanation 
for why it is pro tanto morally permissible to express our blame of the blameworthy with the 
aim of ge^ing them to feel guilt, regret, or remorse. As A. P. Duggan (,/0-, ,1Z) notes, 
expressed “blame is a form of ‘guilting’ in that blamers intend their blame to result in the 
blamed feeling guilty for doing wrong.”17 That is, we often express our blame of transgressors 
in the hopes that they will both come to recognize that we disapprove of what they’ve done and 
come to share in our disapproval by feeling guilt, regret, and remorse for what they’ve done.18  
Of course, we recognize that it will be unpleasant for them to feel this way. So, in 
expressing our blame with the aim of ge^ing them to feel guilt, regret, and remorse, we are 
deliberately causing them to suﬀer.19 And this is potentially morally problematic, for it’s wrong 
to deliberately cause suﬀering unless either those thereby made to suﬀer deserve to so suﬀer or 
our causing them to so suﬀer is the only way to ensure a fair distribution of undeserved 
burdens overall. But despite this, expressions of blame actually seem to be pro tanto morally 
permissible—at least, when the targets are blameworthy (Carlsson ,/0f, 1_).20 This means that 
                                                        
17 See also Carlsson (,/01a), Dill & Darwall (,/0b, bV), Fricker (,/0Z, 0Zf), Macnamara (,/0_, __1), McKenna (,/0,, 
0V1–b/), and Wolf (,/00, VV-).  
18 As Hannah Tierney and others have pointed out, another reason we’re often motivated to express our blame to 
those who have transgressed us is as a means of standing up for ourselves by expressing our sense of dignity and 
self-respect. See Tierney (forthcoming), Murphy (,//_, 01), and Reis-Dennis (,/01).     
19 I concede that one can express one’s blame with only the aim of ge^ing the transgressor to rectify, repent, or 
reconcile and that this needn’t involve deliberately causing her to suﬀer. That is, the associated suﬀering could be 
merely a foreseen but unintended side-eﬀect of one’s aim of ge^ing her to rectify, repent, or reconcile. But I don’t see 
how one can express one’s blame with the aim of ge^ing the transgressor to feel guilty (that is, to feel the painful 
appreciation of the awful signiﬁcance of what one has done) without deliberately causing her to suﬀer. And this is 
often something we aim to do, which is why we are appropriately frustrated when we express our blame with the 
aim of guilting our target and our target responds with no hint of guilt or remorse but only an acknowledgment of 
having done wrong and a sincere promise to do be^er in the future. We get frustrated, because, as Prinz and Nichols 
(,/0/, 0,Z) point out, our goal is not merely to secure some happy result but also to ensure that our target experiences 
feelings of guilt, regret, and remorse so as to come to painfully appreciate the awful signiﬁcance of what she’s done.     
20 To say that it is pro tanto morally permissible for us to express our blame of the blameworthy is not to say that it is 
always morally permissible to do so. It’s just to say that there is a signiﬁcant moral reason to do so such that, absent 
countervailing reasons or undermining considerations, it will be permissible to do so.  
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either the blameworthy must deserve to suﬀer guilt, regret, and remorse or having them so 
suﬀer must be the only way for us to ensure a fair distribution of undeserved burdens overall. 
Yet it’s unclear why either would be the case. After all, to be blameworthy is just to be someone 
whom it is ﬁ^ing to blame, where its ﬁ^ingness is purely a ma^er of the accuracy of its 
representations.21 In this respect, the blaming emotions seem to be no diﬀerent from other 
intentional a^itudes—such as fear, envy, belief, desire, shame, grief, and admiration. In each 
case, the a^itude is ﬁ^ing just in case it is accurate in its representations of the intentional 
object.22 For instance, belief is ﬁ^ing just in case it’s correct in representing its object as being 
true. Envy is ﬁ^ing just in case it’s correct in representing its object as something good that 
one’s rival possesses but that one lacks. And shame is ﬁ^ing just in case it’s correct in 
representing its object as some sub-standard aspect of oneself that could potentially lead to a 
loss of honor, respect, or esteem. So, someone is ﬁ^ingly blamed—that is, blameworthy—if and 
only if that blame is accurate in its representations. But why think that the accuracy of these 
representations depends either on its target deserving to suﬀer or on its being fair to make her 
suﬀer? After all, it’s ﬁ^ing to distrust those who are untrustworthy regardless of whether they 
deserve to suﬀer the burden of being distrusted, and regardless of whether inﬂicting this 
suﬀering upon them would result in a fair distribution of undeserved burdens overall.  
The problem arises because blameworthiness concerns the ﬁ^ingness of blame, and it 
can be ﬁ^ing for you to adopt an a^itude toward someone even if she doesn’t deserve to suﬀer 
the burdens associated with your adopting that a^itude toward her. For instance, it is, as 
Pamela Hieronymi (,//b, 001–,/) has pointed out, ﬁ^ing to distrust the untrustworthy even if 
they don’t deserve to suﬀer the burdens associated with being distrusted, and even if there’s 
nothing fair about their having to suﬀer these burdens. But we can solve this (merely apparent?) 
                                                        
21 The idea that to be blameworthy is just to be ﬁ^ingly blamed is not entirely uncontroversial, but I’ll address the 
relevant controversy below. Also, it may be that not everyone uses the term ‘ﬁ^ing’ to mean ‘accurate in its 
representations’, but this is how I’ll use the term.   
22 For my purposes, an intentional a^itude is to be understood as any mental state that has an intentional object that 
it represents as being a certain way. Thus, examples of intentional a^itudes include hope, fear, envy, guilt, shame, 
desire, belief, intention, and resentment. But they exclude mental states such as pain and hunger, which don’t have 
intentional objects.   
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puzzle so long as we keep separate the issue of whether it’s unjust to distrust the untrustworthy 
(or to blame the blameworthy) and the issue of whether it’s unjust to express distrust of the 
untrustworthy (or to express blame of the blameworthy) with the aim of making them feel some 
inherently unpleasant emotion. These are importantly diﬀerent issues, because, for one, the 
burdens associated with expressing distrust (or blame) can go far beyond those associated with 
merely distrusting (or blaming) in private. For another, one can distrust (or blame) someone 
without deliberately causing them to suﬀer, but one cannot express one’s distrust (or blame) of 
someone with the aim of making her feel, say, shame (or guilt) without deliberately causing her 
to suﬀer. Thus, although it’s unproblematic for us to distrust the untrustworthy, it is—at least, 
potentially—problematic for us to express our distrust of some untrustworthy person with the 
aim of, say, shaming her. For she won’t deserve to suﬀer for her untrustworthiness if she came 
to be this way due entirely to formative circumstances outside of her control. And, so, we still 
need to explain why it is pro tanto morally permissible to express our blame of the blameworthy 
with the aim of guilting them when it is pro tanto morally impermissible to express our distrust of 
the untrustworthy with the aim of shaming them.  
Fortunately, my proposal explains this, for my account entails that, even though the 
untrustworthy don’t necessarily deserve to suﬀer shame, the blameworthy do necessarily 
deserve to suﬀer guilt.23 On my account, blaming a target for having φ-ed entails representing 
her as deserving to suﬀer guilt, regret, or remorse in the recognition that she has violated a 
                                                        
23 Many philosophers agree that the blameworthy deserve to suﬀer guilt, regret, or remorse—see, for instance, 
Carlsson (,/0f, -1) and Duggan (,/0-, ,1f). But, of course, some disagree. For instance, Nelkin (,/01) has argued that 
there is no pro tanto reason to induce feelings of guilt in the blameworthy. To convince us, she poses the following 
thought experiment. Imagine that someone has culpably wronged another and that you have the power of “The 
Look,” whereby you can, simply by giving this someone a certain look, induce her to feel guilty in the recognition 
that what she has done is wrong. But we are to imagine that she is already reformed and, so, will never do this sort of 
thing again. Moreover, we’re to imagine either that her relationship with the relevant others has been irreparably 
damaged or that all has been forgiven. Thus, we’re to imagine that inducing her to feel guilt isn’t a means to any 
good. Nevertheless, Nelkin maintains that you would not be “making a mistake, or leaving a reason on the table, so 
to speak, by taking a pass on inducing this painful feeling.” I disagree. You may not be required to give her “The 
Look,” but you certainly have a reason to do so. Randy Clarke and Piers Rawling agree with me (see their ,/01), and 
much of the psychological research cited above suggests that most people want the blameworthy to feel guilty, not as 
a means to reform or any other instrumental good, but simply because they think that the blameworthy deserve to 
suﬀer guilty feelings.     
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legitimate demand in φ-ing. Thus, she is worthy of being blamed if and only if this 
representation is accurate. And it’s accurate if and only if she deserves to suﬀer these 
unpleasant feelings. Thus, on my account, the blameworthy are just those who have the 
normative property of deserving to suﬀer guilt, regret, or remorse. By contrast, Hieronymi 
(,//b) holds that the blameworthy are simply those who have the descriptive property of 
having acted out of ill will. And, so, she thinks that a subject is blameworthy just in case she has 
in fact acted out of ill will. But given that someone can act out of ill will without deserving to 
suﬀer (for she may have come to possess this ill will due entirely to formative circumstances 
outside of her control), Hieronymi can’t explain why it is pro tanto morally permissible to 
express blame with the aim of ge^ing the target to suﬀer guilt, regret, and remorse.24 So, my 
account has an advantage over accounts such as Hieronymi’s in that it explains why we expect 
even morally good people to be motivated to express their blame of the blameworthy with the 
aim of ge^ing them to suﬀer guilt, regret, and remorse in the recognition that they’ve violated a 
legitimate demand.  
Now, the only other way to account both for this expectation and for the pro tanto moral 
permissibility of deliberately guilting the blameworthy is to adopt Andreas Brekke Carlsson’s 
view (,/0f). On his view, the blameworthy are not, as on my view, those for whom it is ﬁCing to 
feel guilty, but rather are those who deserve to feel guilty. His view, like mine, ensures that the 
blameworthy necessarily deserve to suﬀer guilty feelings, which is what we must hold if we’re 
to account for the pro tanto moral permissibility of deliberately guilting the blameworthy and, 
consequently, for the expectation that even morally good people will be motivated to express 
their blame of the blameworthy with the aim of guilting them. But I believe that we should 
reject Carlsson’s view for the following two reasons. First, it leaves unexplained why the 
blaming emotions (e.g., guilt, resentment, and indignation) are unlike all other intentional 
a^itudes (e.g., pride, fear, belief, shame, disgust, and admiration), which are all appropriate just 
in case they are ﬁ^ing—that is, accurate in their representations.25 Second, it faces the following 
                                                        
24 I borrow this point from Carlsson (,/0f, 1Z). 
25 For more on this point, see Portmore (,/01c) and D’Arms & Jacobson (,/01a). 
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una^ractive dilemma.26 Carlsson must either accept or reject what I’ll call the Deserves-Only-
Fi^ing-Guilt Claim: someone deserves to suﬀer guilt only if that guilt would be ﬁ^ing. And it 
seems that either way his view will be problematic. If, on the one hand, he accepts the Deserves-
Only-Fi^ing-Guilt Claim, then he must, it seems, hold that what makes someone deserve to 
suﬀer ﬁ^ing guilt is simply the fact that it’s ﬁ^ing. After all, on his view (,/01a), what makes it 
ﬁ^ing for one to feel guilt for having φ-ed is not whether it represents one as deserving to suﬀer 
in this way, but rather something such as whether guilt represents one as having manifested ill 
will in φ-ing. So, what makes ﬁ^ing guilt deserved is not the nature of guilt’s representations, 
but simply its ﬁ^ingness.27 The problem, though, is that it’s implausible to suppose that what, 
in general, makes someone deserve to suﬀer some unpleasant emotion is simply that it’s ﬁ^ing. 
After all, it can be ﬁ^ing for someone to feel fear (or grief) without her deserving to suﬀer it. So, 
on this horn of the dilemma, Carlsson needs to explain why it’s only guilt (and not also fear and 
grief) that’s deserved simply in virtue of its ﬁ^ingness. And there just doesn’t seem to be any 
plausible way for him to account for this.  
On the other hand, if Carlsson rejects the Deserves-Only-Fi^ing-Guilt Claim, then his 
view will imply that someone could deserve to suﬀer unﬁ^ing guilt. But this is highly 
implausible. I can see how someone might deserve to suﬀer in general, and I can see how 
someone might deserve to suﬀer the speciﬁc sort of unpleasantness associated with a ﬁ^ingly 
felt emotion. But I can’t see how someone could deserve to suﬀer the speciﬁc unpleasantness 
associated with an unﬁ^ingly felt emotion. To illustrate the problem, let’s suppose that, 
contrary to what I’ve suggested and in accordance with what Carlsson has himself suggested 
(,/0f, 0/f), guilt for having φ-ed represents one as having manifested ill will in φ-ing. Now, if 
                                                        
26 This is objection comes from D’Arms & Jacobson (,/01a), but I put a slightly diﬀerent spin on it.   
27 Carlsson might resist this by claiming that he can account for the Deserves-Only-Fi^ing-Guilt Claim by holding 
that one’s manifesting ill will necessitates one’s deserving to suﬀer. But, in that case, he should just admit that, given 
both that guilt represents one as manifesting ill will and that one’s manifesting ill will necessitates one’s deserving to 
suﬀer guilt, guilt for φ-ing represents one as deserving to suﬀer guilt; it’s just that it does so via representing one as 
having a feature that necessitates one’s deserving to suﬀer guilt. And, in that case, Carlsson’s view would be a 
version of, not an alternative to, my own proposal. For his view would, then, be one that holds that the blameworthy 
are those for whom it is ﬁ^ing to feel guilty.   
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we thought it possible for someone to deserve to feel unﬁ^ing guilt, then we would have to 
hold that it’s possible for someone to deserve to feel the unpleasantness in recognizing that her 
actions manifested ill will even though, in fact, her actions didn’t manifest ill will (which is 
what accounts for its unﬁ^ingness). But it’s just implausible to suppose that someone who 
didn’t manifest ill will could deserve to suﬀer the speciﬁc unpleasantness associated with 
representing oneself as having manifested ill will.  
So, for these two reasons, I think that we should reject Carlsson’s explanation for why 
the blameworthy necessarily deserve to suﬀer. Instead, we should take the explanation to be, as 
I’ve supposed, both that the blameworthy are those who are ﬁ^ingly blamed and that it’s ﬁ^ing 
to blame someone only if she deserves to suﬀer the unpleasantness of guilt, regret, or remorse 
given the nature of blame’s representations.  
7.E The Conditions for Blameworthiness: Another merit of my proposal is that it can account 
for the fact that there are certain necessary conditions for being blameworthy (e.g., the control 
condition and the epistemic condition) as well as certain necessary conditions for being 
blameworthy to a certain degree (e.g., the proportionality condition). Take, for instance, the 
control condition (sometimes called the freedom condition). It holds that someone can be 
blameworthy for having φ-ed only if she had the relevant sort of control over whether she was 
to φ. My proposal can explain this so long as we assume, as seems plausible, that someone 
deserves to suﬀer some inherently unpleasant emotion for having φ-ed only if she had the 
relevant sort of control over whether she was to φ. Thus, we get the following argument for the 
control condition. 
 
(P0) Someone is blameworthy for having φ-ed if and only if blaming her for having 
φ-ed is accurate in its representations. [Assumption] 
(P,)  Blaming someone for having φ-ed is accurate in its representations only if she 
deserves to suﬀer guilt, regret, or remorse for having φ-ed. [From Condition 0 of 
my proposal] 
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(C0) Thus, someone is blameworthy for having φ-ed only if she deserves to suﬀer 
guilt, regret, or remorse for having φ-ed. [From P0–P,] 
(PV) Someone deserves to suﬀer guilt, regret, or remorse for having φ-ed only if she 
had the relevant sort of control over whether she was to φ. [Assumption] 
(C,)  Therefore, someone is blameworthy for having φ-ed only if she had the relevant 
sort of control over whether she was to φ. [From C0 and PV] 
 
We can similarly argue for the epistemic condition (sometimes called the knowledge 
condition). It holds that someone is blameworthy for having φ-ed only if she could have 
reasonably been expected to have known that her φ-ing would entail violating a legitimate 
demand. To get this argument, we simply need to replace “she had the relevant sort of control 
over whether she was to φ” with “she could have reasonably been expected to have known that 
her φ-ing would entail violating a legitimate demand” throughout the above argument, while 
replacing “control condition” with “epistemic condition” in C,.   
What’s more, we can oﬀer the following argument for the proportionality condition, 
which holds that someone is worthy of being blamed to extent E for having φ-ed only if E is 
proportionate to the stringency of the demand that she violated in φ-ing (see, e.g., Fricker ,/0Z, 
0Z-).  
 
(P0*) Someone is worthy of being blamed to extent E for having φ-ed if and only if 
blaming her to extent E for having φ-ed is accurate in its representations. 
[Assumption] 
(P,*)  Blaming someone to extent E for having φ-ed is accurate in its representations 
only if the amount of guilt, regret, and remorse that she deserves to suﬀer for 
having φ-ed is proportionate to E. [From my proposal] 
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(C0*) Thus, someone is worthy of being blamed to extent E for having φ-ed only if the 
amount of guilt, regret, and remorse that she deserves to suﬀer for having φ-ed is 
proportionate to E. [From P0*–P,*] 
(PV*) The amount of guilt, regret, and remorse that she deserves to suﬀer for having φ-
ed must be proportionate to the stringency of the demand that she violated in φ-
ing. [Assumption] 
(C,*)  Therefore, someone is worthy of being blamed to extent E for having φ-ed only if 
E is proportionate to the stringency of the demand that she violated in φ-ing. 
[From C0* and PV*] 
 
We need to appeal to all three conditions in order to account for our judgments about 
when it is appropriate to blame people and in what degree.28 And accounting for such 
judgments is, I believe, crucial. As Scanlon has pointed out, “a satisfactory account of blame 
should be as faithful as possible to the phenomenology of blaming and to our judgments about 
when it is appropriate to blame people and in what degree” (,/0V, -b). So, consider that without 
the proportionality condition we have no way of accounting for the fact that it would, other 
things being equal, be inappropriate for us to blame someone who has violated a less stringent 
demand more harshly than we blame someone who has violated a more stringent demand. For 
instance, it would, other things being equal, be inappropriate for us to blame someone who has 
told a self-serving but relatively harmless lie more harshly than we blame someone who has 
commi^ed murder.    
We need the epistemic condition to explain why non-culpable ignorance can excuse one 
from being blameworthy for having violated a legitimate demand. For instance, even if it’s 
                                                        
28 I readily concede that there may be other conditions for being blameworthy. For instance, it may be that the 
person-stage who is now to be blamed must be, in certain relevant ways, psychologically similar to (or contiguous 
with) the person-stage who commi^ed the given transgression. But I won’t explore the possibility of such other 
conditions here. In any case, it seems that these other proposed conditions will be plausible only insofar as they’re 
plausible conditions for a target’s deserving to suﬀer guilt, regret, or remorse in virtue of something that some earlier 
person-stage did.   
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legitimate to demand that I not come into the oﬃce while contagious, it’s inappropriate to 
blame me for doing so if I couldn’t have been reasonably expected to have known that I was 
infected, let alone contagious.  
Lastly, we need to appeal to the control condition to explain both why the only subjects 
that we can appropriately blame are those who possess the relevant sort of control over the 
things that we blame them for and why the only things that we can appropriately directly blame 
them for are those things over which they directly exerted such control.29 Thus, the control 
condition explains why newborns and primitive animals—both of which lack the relevant sort 
of control—are exempt from blame. And it explains why normal adult human beings cannot 
appropriately be blamed for their reﬂex actions, muscle twitches, or heart palpitations. After all, 
they lack the relevant sort of control over these bodily movements. What’s more, it explains 
why a drunk driver can be held directly responsible, not for her impaired motor skills, but only 
for that which led to her impaired motor skills—assuming that that was something over which 
she did exert the relevant sort of control. Perhaps, then, the only thing that we can appropriately 
hold her directly responsible for is her having started to drink without having ﬁrst arranged for 
a designated driver.   
Of course, some cite the fact that we often take ourselves to be (normatively) responsible 
for our non-voluntary “actions”—e.g., for desiring what’s bad, believing what’s contrary to the 
evidence, and intending to do what’s incompatible with our ultimate ends—as reason for being 
skeptical of the control condition. But the fact that we can be responsible for such things doesn’t 
give us any reason to doubt the control condition, but only reason to doubt that the relevant sort 
of control is as narrow as voluntary control. To understand why, we must understand what 
                                                        
29 Note, then, that I deny what’s known as resultant moral luck (Zimmerman 01-f): the idea that one’s degree of 
accountability for φ-ing can be aﬀected by the uncontrolled events that determine the results of one’s φ-ing. For some 
compelling arguments against resultant moral luck, see Khoury (,/0-). And for some experimental evidence 
suggesting that what most aﬀects our judgments about an agent’s degree of accountability for some act is not 
whether, by luck, the act had a bad result but whether we judge that the agent was unjustiﬁed in believing that her 
act had li^le chance of having that bad result, see Young, Nichols, & Saxe (,/0/). Also, some take Frankfurt-style 
cases as evidence against the control condition, but see Portmore (,/01a) and Portmore (,/01b) for a rebu^al.  
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voluntary control consists in and why we must exert it over our actions to be responsible for 
them.  
For a subject to have voluntary control over an action is for her to have volitional control 
over whether she performs it while having rational control over whether she forms the volitions 
that would result in her performing it. She has volitional control over whether she performs the 
act so long as, holding everything else ﬁxed, whether she performs it just depends on whether 
she forms the relevant volitions (e.g., the intention to perform it), and she has rational control 
over whether she forms the relevant volitions so long as, holding everything else ﬁxed, whether 
she forms them just depends on whether and how she responds to the relevant reasons. Note, 
then, that volitional control over our actions is insuﬃcient to ground responsibility for them. 
After all, just as I have volitional control over whether I raise my hand, a cat presumably has 
volitional control over whether it will swat at the mouse that scurries by. Yet, presumably, a cat 
is not responsible for swa^ing at the mouse because whether it forms the volition to swat isn’t 
under its rational control. That is, whether it forms this volition is just a ma^er of some non–
reasons-responsive mechanism, such as pure instinct—or so I’ll assume. By contrast, I can be 
responsible for raising my hand given that (or insofar as) whether I form the volition to do so is 
reasons-responsive and, thus, under my rational control. This, as I’ve argued elsewhere 
(Portmore ,/01b), suggests that what really ma^ers for responsibility is rational control. Indeed, 
it seems that the only reason that we need to have volitional control over our actions to be 
responsible for them is that it’s only by having volitional control over our actions that we come 
to have rational control over them.30 For we cannot act directly in response to our reasons. 
Indeed, we act in response to our reasons only by being guided by our reasons to form the 
volitions that will, if the world cooperates, result in our performing the act in question.    
It seems, then, that we need the control condition in conjunction with the idea that the 
relevant sort of control is rational control to adequately distinguish between those things for 
which we can be held resp/nsible—e.g., our beliefs, intentions, and voluntary actions—and 
those things for which we can’t be held responsible—e.g., our sensations, pangs of hunger, and 
                                                        
30 See also McHugh (,/0f, ,,fb1).  
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involuntary actions. The former are those things over which we exert rational control and the 
la^er are those things over which we lack such control. So, I admit that many of the things that 
we hold each other responsible for are non-voluntary and, thus, are things over which we lack 
voluntary control. But this shows, not that we should reject the control condition, but only that 
we should accept that the relevant sort of control is rational control. And, so, it’s a merit of my 
proposal that it allows us to account for the fact that we can be blameworthy for the non-
voluntary.  
This is important, because it seems that we can be responsible for our voluntary actions 
and their eﬀects only if we can be responsible for our non-voluntary “actions”—speciﬁcally, for 
both our belief formations and our volition formations. For as I’ve just shown, we can be 
responsible for the actions that stem from our volitions only if we’re responsible for the 
formations of the volitions that gave rise to them. And, as both Nikolaj No^lemann (,//f) and 
Rik Peels (,/0f) have shown, we can be responsible for the eﬀects of our voluntary actions only 
if we’re responsible for the formations of our beliefs about their eﬀects. This is because of the 
epistemic condition. According to the epistemic condition, one can be responsible for acting in 
violation of a legitimate demand only if one could have been reasonably expected to have 
known that so acting would constitute the violation of such a demand. To illustrate, it seems 
that I can be responsible for infecting my co-workers with a virus by coming into the oﬃce only 
if I could have been reasonably expected to have known (and, thus, to have believed) that my 
doing so would infect them. So, given the epistemic condition, it seems that I can be responsible 
for the eﬀects of my actions only if I’m responsible for my beliefs about their eﬀects. And, so, if 
we’re going to be blameworthy for anything, including our voluntary actions and their eﬀects, 
the correct account of blame be^er allow, as mine does, for the possibility that we can be 
ﬁ^ingly blamed for the non-voluntary.     
Of course, many will concede that we can be blameworthy for the non-voluntary but 
claim that this responsibility for the non-voluntary must be indirect. That is, they’ll appeal to the 
well-known tracing strategy (i.e., the strategy of claiming that our responsibility for something 
non-voluntary must ultimately trace back to something that was under our voluntary control) 
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to account for our responsibility for our forming the relevant beliefs and volitions. Now, there 
are, I believe, several problems with this strategy when it comes to accounting for our 
responsibility for such a^itudes—not the least of which is that it can lead to an inﬁnite regress. 
But because many of these problems have been elucidated elsewhere, I’ll mention just one 
below.31    
Those who employ the tracing strategy hold that someone can be responsible for, say, 
forming the belief that p even if this was never under her voluntary control. For they hold her 
responsible for forming this belief in virtue of her having had voluntary control over some prior 
deliberate act such that she wouldn’t have formed this belief had she performed (or refrained 
from performing) this act. So, for instance, if someone fallaciously forms the belief that taking 
vitamins causes an increase in longevity solely on the basis of an established correlation 
between the two, the tracing strategist would claim that she’s responsible (although only 
indirectly) for forming this fallacious belief only in virtue of her having been directly 
responsible for, say, voluntarily skipping the relevant critical thinking class—that is, the class 
that, had she a^ended, would have prevented her from making this fallacious inference. But the 
problem with this strategy is that it holds that what she’s directly responsible for is skipping 
class rather than making a fallacious inference. That is, on this strategy, the demand that she is 
ultimately accountable for violating is, not the epistemic demand that she not infer causation on 
the basis of mere correlation, but the practical demand that she a^end useful classes. But, 
intuitively, it seems that what she’s ultimately accountable for is violating an epistemic demand. 
And this is why, when we interact with her, we’re much more likely to exhort her for failing to 
respond appropriately to her epistemic reasons than we are to exhort her for failing to respond 
appropriately to her practical reasons. And this suggests that what we actually hold her 
accountable for is violating an epistemic demand and not a practical demand, as the tracing 
strategist insists.     
                                                        
31 For criticisms of the tracing strategy (where only indirect blame is appropriate for the non-voluntary), see Smith 
(,/0_), Vargas (,//_), McKenna (,//-), and Portmore (,/01a).  
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7.H How What a Transgressor Has Done and Experienced Subsequent to Her Wrongdoing Can 
Aﬀect the Extent to which She Is Presently Blameworthy for that Wrongdoing: A fourth and ﬁnal 
reason to accept the necessity of condition 0 is that it allows us to plausibly account for the fact 
that what a transgressor has done and experienced subsequent to her wrongdoing can aﬀect the 
extent to which she is presently blameworthy for that wrongdoing. I’m not saying that it aﬀects 
the extent to which she is responsible for having commi^ed that wrongdoing in the ﬁrst place, 
but it does, I believe, aﬀect the extent to which she should continue to feel guilt, regret, and 
remorse as well as the extent to which others should continue to feel resentment and 
indignation toward her. To illustrate, suppose that Alexa has wrongly harmed Alex and that 
Berta has wrongly harmed Bert. And assume that everything else is equal but for the following 
two facts. First, whereas Alexa has subsequently experienced much guilt, regret, and remorse 
for what she has done, Berta has experienced none.32 Second, whereas Alexa has done much to 
make amends (apologizing profusely and even paying reparations to Alex), Berta has done 
nothing to atone for her wrongdoing. It seems, then, that the extent to which it is appropriate 
for Alexa to continue to feel guilty and for Alex to continue to feel resentment is much less than 
                                                        
32 This is relevant, for feelings of guilt are self-consuming (Na’aman forthcoming) with respect to their ﬁ^ingness such 
that it becomes unﬁ^ing to continue to have such feelings—or, at least, to continue to have them with the same 
intensity—if you’ve already experienced them quite a bit. In this respect, guilt diﬀers from grief. For no ma^er how 
much grief you have already experienced, it never ceases to be ﬁ^ing to feel further grief, nor does it cease to be 
ﬁ^ing to grieve with the same intensity as before. After all, grief over X represents X as a signiﬁcant loss, and the 
more intense your grief, the more signiﬁcant a loss it represents it as being. Yet, a loss doesn’t become any less 
signiﬁcant just because you’ve already grieved a lot over it. So, if your present circumstances make vivid to you the 
true signiﬁcance of your loss, it will be entirely ﬁ^ing for you to feel the same intense grief that you initially felt when 
you ﬁrst came to grips with that loss. By contrast, guilt for having φ-ed represents you as someone who has not 
suﬀered all that you deserve to suﬀer in virtue of your having φ-ed, and the more intense your guilt, the greater the 
amount of guilt it represents you as still deserving to suﬀer. So, guilt, unlike grief, is self-consuming with respect to 
its ﬁ^ingness given that you can come to deserve to suﬀer less (and, perhaps, even not at all) as a result of your 
having already suﬀered a lot. (I acknowledge that it can be inappropriate to regularly feel the same intense grief that 
you initially felt over some loss when it’s now been several years since that loss occurred. But I think that it’s 
inappropriate, not in the sense of being unﬁ^ing, but in some other sense and that we can, therefore, account for this 
without thinking that grief is self-consuming with respect to its ﬁ^ingness—see Portmore ,/01c.)    
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that to which it is appropriate for Berta to continue to feel guilty and for Bert to continue to feel 
resentment.33      
My proposal explains why Alex and Berta diﬀer in their degrees of blameworthiness. 
Given that Alexa, unlike Berta, has done much to atone for her wrongdoing and has already 
suﬀered a tremendous amount of guilt, regret, and remorse, she doesn’t deserve to suﬀer as 
much further guilt, regret, and remorse as Berta does. On my proposal, those who deserve to 
suﬀer less guilt, regret, and remorse are less blameworthy, because, on my proposal, the greater 
the amount of guilt, regret, and remorse that one represents some target as still deserving to 
suﬀer, the greater the extent to which one blames that target. Thus, it is ﬁ^ing to blame 
someone to extent E if and only if E is proportionate to the amount of guilt, regret, and remorse 
that she still deserves to suﬀer. And, so, Alexa is less blameworthy than Berta given that the 
amount of guilt, regret, and remorse that Alexa still deserves to suﬀer is less than the amount of 
guilt, regret, and remorse that Berta still deserves to suﬀer.   
This gives my proposal a distinct advantage over most other views of blame, for most 
other views of blame are unable to account for the fact that what a transgressor has done and 
experienced subsequent to her wrongdoing can aﬀect the extent to which she is presently 
blameworthy for that wrongdoing. For although what someone has done and experienced 
subsequent to her wrongdoing can aﬀect the extent to which she still deserves to suﬀer guilt, 
regret, and remorse for that wrongdoing, most other views about blame deny that blaming 
someone for having φ-ed represents her as not having suﬀered all that she deserves to suﬀer for 
having φ-ed. Instead, they hold that this represents her as having “violated a moral requirement 
of respect” in φ-ing (Graham ,/0b, b/-) or as having manifested ill will in φ-ing (Hieronymi 
,//b), or as presently possessing the same ﬂaw that led to her φ-ing (Khoury & Matheson ,/0-). 
And the correctness of these representations does not depend on what she has done or 
experienced subsequent to her φ-ing. So, unlike my proposal, these views cannot account for 
                                                        
33 For more on this, see Carlsson (,/01b) and Portmore (,/01c).  
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the fact that what a transgressor has done or experienced subsequent to her transgression can 
aﬀect the extent to which she is presently blameworthy for that transgression.    
Indeed, the only view of blame besides my own that can account for this fact is 
Carlsson’s view. For like my view, his view implies that the extent to which someone is 
presently blameworthy for having φ-ed depends on the extent to which she still deserves to 
suﬀer guilt, regret, and remorse for having φ-ed. But, as we saw above, Carlsson’s view faces an 
una^ractive dilemma. So, it seems that the only plausible way to account for this fact is to accept 
my proposal.                     
       
>. The Necessity of Condition : 
On my proposal, condition , is also necessary for blame. That is, a subject blames someone for 
having seemingly φ-ed only if she feels disapproval of, or disappointment in, that someone for 
having seemingly φ-ed. We should accept this, because, as everyone seems to agree, blame 
requires more than mere evaluative judgment.34 To blame someone, you must do more than 
simply judge, say, that she shouldn’t have φ-ed. You must feel disapproval of, or 
disappointment in, her for having φ-ed. This, I take it, is uncontroversial. The controversy is not 
about whether such disapproval is required, but is only about what, if anything, else is 
required. And, as I’ll now argue, the only other thing that’s required is condition 0. Thus, 
conditions 0 and , are, I believe, jointly suﬃcient.  
       
?. The Joint Suﬃciency of these Two Conditions 
In defense of their joint suﬃciency, I hope to show that no other proposed condition is 
necessary. Take, ﬁrst, the proposal that blame must involve resentment, indignation, or some 
other kind of hostile emotion (Wallace 011b, f_). We should reject this proposal, for, as George 
                                                        
34 See, for instance, Coates & Tognazzini (,/0V), Darwall (,/0/), Scanlon (,//-; ,/0V), Sher (,//Z), Shoemaker (,/0V, 
0/0), and Smith (,/0V).  
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Sher (,//Z) and several others have noted, blame need not involve any anger or hostility.35 As 
Sher notes, “we may, for example, feel no hostility toward the loved one whom we blame for 
failing to tell a sensitive acquaintance a hard truth, the criminal whom we blame for a burglary 
we read about in the newspaper, or the historical ﬁgure whom we blame for the misdeeds he 
performed long ago” (Sher ,//Z, --). Of course, on my proposal, blame must involve a feeling 
of disapproval or disappointment, but neither need be heated or hostile; these a^itudes can, 
instead, be quite calm and sedate.  
Second, Scanlon has proposed that blaming someone involves taking “your relationship 
with him or her to be modiﬁed” (,//-, 0,-–1). But, as Susan Wolf has noted, this isn’t a 
necessary condition for blame. Sometimes when we blame someone there is a lot of screaming 
and remonstration but no relationship modiﬁcation (,/00, VVb). Indeed, when it comes to certain 
close family members, we are often resigned to continuing on with the relationship as always 
despite everything. Of course, this doesn’t prevent us from blaming them by both disapproving 
of their behavior and representing them as deserving of guilt, regret, or remorse. Indeed, this 
may just be part of our relationship’s normal pa^ern in which they wrong us and then we 
blame them, but, despite this, we both just continue on with the relationship as always.   
Third, some propose that blaming someone necessitates some belief or judgment about 
her, such as that she is blameworthy (Sher ,//Z) or has displayed ill will (Hieronymi ,//b), or 
has been diminished in her moral standing (Zimmerman 01--). But not only do we not need to 
assent to such things, we can even deny such things while blaming. For, as I noted above, blame 
can be recalcitrant. My wife can blame me for having seemingly cheated on her while denying 
that I am blameworthy or that I have cheated on her, or even that I have manifested ill will 
toward her. Indeed, it seems that if there are any beliefs or judgments that are necessitated in 
blaming someone it is only those that are constitutive of disapproving of, or being disappointed 
in, her.  
                                                        
35 See Brown (forthcoming), Smith (,/0V, V,), and Shoemaker & Vargas (forthcoming).  
 31 
Fourth, someone might claim that blame must involve some overt act—perhaps, one 
that communicates some protest or a demand for respect. But, even those who hold that blame’s 
function is communicative allow that blame need not actually be communicated. For they hold 
that one’s blame, like one’s unsent email, can count as communicative in nature even if it is 
never in fact communicated (e.g., Macnamara ,/0_). Therefore, we should deny that blame 
must involve some overt act. Indeed, blame seems to be something that one can do in the 
privacy of one’s own study (Coates & Tognazzini ,/0V, -).      
Of course, these four don’t exhaust the possibilities for potential necessary conditions for 
blame. But I believe that they constitute the most plausible proposals, and, what’s more, they’re 
the ones that have been most central in the existing literature. So, I think we should—at least, 
tentatively—conclude that there are no other necessary conditions besides those stated in my 
proposal.   
       
D. How My Proposal Accounts for All the Disparate Forms of Blame 
Another advantage of my proposal is that it can account for blame in all its disparate forms. 
First, as we’ve already seen, it allows that blame can be recalcitrant.  
Second, it allows that blame can be either intrapersonal or interpersonal. For on my 
proposal the target of blame may or may not be identical to the one doing the blaming. Thus, 
the target of blame can be either oneself (and, thus, intrapersonal) or some other (and, thus, 
interpersonal).  
Third, it allows that the target of blame can be alive or dead. For, on my proposal, 
blaming need involve only both a feeling of disapproval and a representation of desert. And we 
can have both a^itudes toward the dead as well as the living. For just as we can disapprove of 
what the living have done, we can disapprove of what the dead have done. And just as we can 
represent the living as not having suﬀered all the guilt, regret, and remorse that they deserve to 
suﬀer, we can represent the dead as not having suﬀered all the guilt, regret, and remorse that 
they deserve to suﬀer. Or if you think that it makes no sense to talk of the dead deserving 
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(present tense) to suﬀer, we can just add the following parenthetical remark to the relevant 
portion of My Proposal to get the following: “not having suﬀered all that she deserves (or 
deserved) to suﬀer.”   
Fourth, it allows that blame need not be heated or hostile. Although it is quite common 
for us to feel anger and hostility toward those we blame, my proposal allows that blame need 
not involve such hostility, for we can feel disapproval without feeling any anger or hostility. 
Thus, when we blame some historical ﬁgure for some long past misdeed, we may be quite calm 
and sedate. For we may just calmly disapprove of what that ﬁgure has done while believing 
both that she did thereby violate a legitimate demand and that she did not suﬀer all the guilt, 
regret, and remorse that she deserved to suﬀer for having done so.      
Fifth, my proposal allows that blame can be either expressed and made public or 
unexpressed and kept private. For, again, my proposal holds that blame need only involve both 
a feeling of disapproval and a representation of desert. And one can possess such a^itudes 
without expressing them. 
Sixth, my proposal allows that we can be blamed both for the voluntary and for the non-
voluntary. On my proposal, the variable ‘φ’ ranges over all the things that a target can do in 
response to reasons and not just those things that are under her voluntary control. And I’ve 
concluded, therefore, that ‘φ’ ranges over such things as the formation of a reasons-responsive 
a^itude (e.g., a belief, desire, or intention). Thus, we can, on my proposal, be accountable for 
such things as desiring what’s bad, believing what’s contrary to the evidence, and intending to 
do what’s incompatible with our ultimate ends—and this is so despite the fact that we don’t (at 
least, not typically) have voluntary control over whether we form such a^itudes.  
Seventh, my proposal allows that blame need not be speciﬁcally moral. For, on my 
proposal, blame requires representing the target as having violated a legitimate demand, but 
that demand needn’t be a moral one. And this is important, because we often blame ourselves 
for our non-moral failings: for our aesthetic bad taste, gustatory self-indulgence, or poor athletic 
or intellectual performance. As David Shoemaker and Manuel Vargas (forthcoming) have 
noted, we often blame ourselves for failing to live up to the ideals that we set for ourselves. 
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And, as J. David Velleman (,//V) notes, we routinely blame ourselves for failing to fulﬁll our 
commitments to ourselves—e.g., our commitment to maintain a certain diet or exercise regimen. 
What’s more, we even blame others for their non-moral failings. For instance, “a Maﬁoso can be 
said to blame an associate for violating the code of omertà” (by, say, ra^ing him out to the FBI) 
even if he admits that his associate hasn’t thereby violated any moral demand and has, in fact, 
done what he was morally required to do (Scanlon ,/0V, --).36     
My proposal accounts for such non-moral blame, both because the demands that my 
proposal refer to need not be moral demands and because my proposal allows that in blaming 
someone we need not represent her as deserving to suﬀer some unpleasant moral emotion (such 
as moral guilt) but could instead represent her as deserving to suﬀer some unpleasant non-moral 
emotion (such as regret or non-moral guilt).37 Of course, you may question whether there is such 
a thing as non-moral guilt. But consider that we feel guilty for such things as skipping the gym, 
drinking too much, overindulging at the buﬀet, and making some impulsive and ill-advised 
purchase. We even have special names for some of these kinds of guilt: e.g., “food guilt” and 
“consumer guilt.” And these kinds of guilt don’t seem to be particularly moral.  
But even if you insist that guilt must concern morality, my account allows that when we 
blame someone we may represent her as deserving only regret, and regret needn’t concern 
morality. To illustrate, consider the sorts of objections that I get during the Q&A of one of my 
talks. Sometimes, it’s an objection that I’ve anticipated. Other times, it’s an objection that I never 
would have thought of myself. But, occasionally, it’s an obvious objection that I should have, 
but failed to, anticipate. In these instances, I blame myself for not having anticipated the 
obvious objection. I get angry with myself. Indeed, I could just kick myself. Perhaps, what I’m 
feeling is be^er characterized as regret rather than as guilt. But such regret seems to share with 
guilt what are, for our purposes, the same relevant features. My regret, like my guilt, is elicited 
                                                        
36 Other proponents of the view that we can be blamed for our perceived non-moral failings include Björnsson (,/0f) 
and Matheson & Milam (,/01).  
37 Also, the demands need not be legitimate ones. On my proposal, blaming the Maﬁoso requires only representing 
him as having violated a legitimate demand. And one can make this representation without the code of omertà 
actually being a legitimate demand.   
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by a transgression. It’s just that, in this case, the standards that I’ve transgressed are the 
intellectual standards to which I’ve commi^ed myself. My regret, like my guilt, is unpleasant in 
its aﬀect. And yet, like my guilt, my regret focuses my a^ention on the mistake and its adverse 
eﬀects, thereby inﬂaming its unpleasantness. Thus, like my guilt, my regret motivates me to 
self-punish. Instead of trying to distract myself from it by focusing my a^ention elsewhere, I 
wallow in its associated pain. Indeed, it strikes me as if I deserve to suﬀer in this way. For it’s 
not that I’m thinking that it’s instrumentally good for me to suﬀer in this way. That is, I’m not 
thinking that I need to suﬀer like this so that I’ll remember next time to think long and hard 
about such possible objections. After all, I did think long and hard this time around. And this is 
what makes my failure all the more frustrating: this objection should have occurred to me 
because it should have occurred to anyone who had dedicated even a quarter of the time that I 
did to thinking of possible objections.  
Perhaps, you might think that I’m idiosyncratic in my propensity for self-ﬂagellation. 
But athletes react in the same way to their failures (Shoemaker ,/01). Some will even pound 
their heads or pull their hair. What’s more, psychological research suggests that guilt and regret 
are very similar in the ways that I’m suggesting. As Zeelenberg and Breugelmans (,//-, _1b) 
found in their research, “both emotions involved thoughts about having done something 
wrong, having done damage to oneself, and being responsible for what happened, feeling angry 
with yourself, feeling like kicking yourself, wanting to undo what happened, and wanting to 
improve yourself” (Zeelenberg & Breugelmans ,//-, _1b). So, I believe that it’s a merit of my 
proposal that it allows that there can be non-moral blame and that such blame may involve 
representing its target as deserving to suﬀer only regret or non-moral guilt (and not some moral 
emotion) in the recognition that one has, say, failed to live up to the non-moral ideals that one is 
commi^ed to.        
  
H. Conclusion 
I’ve argued that there are two individually necessary and jointly suﬃcient conditions for one’s 
blaming someone for having seemingly φ-ed: (Condition 0) one has some set of mental states 
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that represents that target (a) as having φ-ed, (b) as having violated a legitimate demand in φ-
ing, and (c) as not having suﬀered all the guilt, regret, and remorse that she deserves to suﬀer in 
the recognition of having violated this legitimate demand and (Condition ,) one feels, as a 
result of these representations, disapproval of, or disappointment in, that someone for having 
seemingly φ-ed.   
This proposal accounts for: (0) the empirical data concerning both what elicits and what 
palliates the blaming emotions as well as the empirical data concerning what sorts of act-
tendencies are typically associated with these emotions; (,) the fact that it’s pro tanto morally 
permissible to express one’s blame of the blameworthy with the aim of guilting them even 
though it is pro tanto morally impermissible to express one’s distrust of the untrustworthy with 
the aim of shaming them; (V) the fact that there are certain necessary conditions both for being 
blameworthy (e.g., the control condition and the epistemic condition) and for being 
blameworthy to a certain extent (e.g., the proportionality condition); and (b) the fact that what a 
transgressor has done and experienced subsequent to her wrongdoing can aﬀect the extent to 
which she is presently blameworthy for that wrongdoing. And I’ve shown that this proposal 
allows us to account for blame in all its disparate forms.  
Given all that this proposal accounts for, I believe that we should accept it. And whether 
we should accept it is important, not only because the current literature seems to lack a 
comprehensive account of blame, but also because it tells us something very important about 
the nature of blame: it represents its target as being someone who deserves to suﬀer guilt, 
regret, or remorse in the recognition that she has violated a legitimate demand. This is 
important because it may turn out both that all our actions are causally determined and that no 
one ever deserves to suﬀer in virtue of an action that she was causally determined to perform.38   
                                                        
38 For helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts, I thank Vuko Andrić, Michael Bukoski, Cheshire Calhoun, 
Andreas Brekke Carlsson, Brad Cokelet, Christian Coons, Justin D’Arms, Austin P. Duggan, Christel Fricke, Richard 
Alonzo Fyfe, Dan Jacobson, Andrew Khoury, Eden Lin, Michelle Mason, Michael McKenna, Coleen McNamara, 
Dana Nelkin, Derk Pereboom, Caleb Perl, Theron Pummer, George Sher, David Shoemaker, Philip Swenson, Krista 
Thomason, Hannah Tierney, Travis Timmerman, Alec Walen, and audiences at both the twelfth annual Rocky 
Mountain Ethics Congress and the University of Oslo’s Workshop on Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility.  
 36 
 
 
References 
 
Bastian, B., J. Je^en, and F. Fasoli (,/00). “Cleansing the Soul by Hurting the Flesh: The Guilt-
Reducing Eﬀect of Pain.” Psychological Science ,,: VVb–V_.  
Baumeister, R. F., A. M. Stillwell, and T. F. Heatherton (011b). “Guilt: An Interpersonal 
Approach.” Psychological Bulletin 00_: ,bV–Zf. 
Bok, H. (011-). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Björnsson, G. (,/0f). “Review of Rik Peels, Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology.” 
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 
Brady, M. S. (,//1). “The Irrationality of Recalcitrant Emotions.” Philosophical Studies 0b_: b0V–
V/. 
Brown, J. (forthcoming). “What is Epistemic Blame?” Noûs.   
Carlsson, A. B. (,/01a). “Shame and A^ributability.” In D. Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in 
Agency and Responsibility, Vol. Z, pp. 00,–V1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. (,/01b). “Guilt and Blameworthiness over Time.” Draft of September ,,, ,/01.  
———. (,/0f). “Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.” Journal of Ethics ,0: -1–00_. 
Clarke, R. and P. Rawling (,/01). “Reason to Feel Guilty.” Draft of September 0, ,/01. 
Coates, D. J, and N. Tognazzini (,/0V). “The Contours of Blame.” In D. J, and N. Tognazzini 
(eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms, pp. V–,Z. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Darwall, S. (,/0/). “But It Would Be Wrong.” Social Philosophy and Policy ,f: 0V_–_f. 
D’Arms, J. and D. Jacobson (,/01a). “The Motivational Theory of Guilt (and Responsibility).” 
Draft of September 0b, ,/01. 
 37 
———. (,/01b). Chapter f of Rational Sentimentalism tentatively entitled “Fi^ingness for 
Sentimentalists”—draft of October ,/01. Under contract with Oxford University Press.  
———. (,/0f). “Whither Sentimentalism? On Fear, the Fearsome, and the Dangerous.” In R. 
Debes and K. Stueber (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, pp. ,V/–b1. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. (,//V). “The Signiﬁcance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism).” 
Philosophy _, (Supp): 0,f–b_. 
Dill, B. and S. Darwall (,/0b). “Moral Psychology as Accountability.” In J. D’Arms and D. 
Jacobson (eds.), Moral Psychology & Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of 
Ethics, pp. b/–-V. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Driver, J. (011,). “The Suberogatory.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy f/: ,-Z–1_. 
Duggan, A. P. (,/0-). “Moral Responsibility as Guiltworthiness.” Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice ,0: ,10–V/1. 
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (,//,). “Altruistic Punishment in Humans.” Nature b0_: 0Vf–b/. 
Feinberg, J. (01f/). Doing and Deserving. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Fricker, M. (,/0Z). “What’s the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation.” Noûs _/: 0Z_–
-V. 
Gibbard, A. (011/). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.   
Gintis, H., E. Smith, and S. Bowles (,//0). “Costly Signaling and Cooperation.” Journal of 
Theoretical Biology ,0V: 0/V–01. 
Gollwi~er, M. and M. Denzler (,//1). “What Makes Revenge Wweet: Seeing the Oﬀender Suﬀer 
or Delivering a Message?” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology b_: -b/–bb. 
Graham, P. (,/0b). “A Sketch of a Theory of Blameworthiness.” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research --: V--–b/1. 
 38 
Haidt, J., J. Sabini,J., D. Gromet, and J. Darley. (,/0/). “What Exactly Makes Revenge Sweet? 
How Anger Is Satisﬁed in Real Life and at the Movies.” Unpublished manuscript. URL =  
h^ps://bit.ly/V_-_-cZ. Accessed October f, ,/01. 
Hieronymi, P. (,//b). “The Force and Fairness of Blame.” Philosophical Perspectives 0-: 00_–b1. 
Inbar, Y., D. A. Pizarro, T. Gilovich, and D. Ariely (,/0V). “Moral Masochism: On the Connection 
between Guilt and Self-Punishment.” Emotion 0V: 0b–-. 
Khoury, A. C. (,/0-). “The Objects of Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical Studies 0f_: 0,V_f–-0. 
Khoury, A. C. and B. Matheson (,/0-). “Is Blameworthiness Forever?” Journal of the American 
Philosophical Association b: ,/b–,b. 
Lewis, H. B. (01f0). Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. New York: International Universities Press.  
Lewis, M. (,///). “Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and Guilt.” In M. 
Lewis and J. M. Haviland-Jones (eds.) Handbook of Emotions, ,nd ed., pp. Z,V–VZ. New York: 
Guilford. 
Macnamara, C. (,/0_). “Reactive A^itudes as Communicative Entities.” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 1/: _bZ–Z1. 
———. (,/0V). “Taking Demands Out of Blame.” In D. J, and N. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its 
Nature and Norms, pp. 0b0–Z0. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Matheson, B. and P.-E. Milam (,/01). “The Case for Non-Moral Blame.” Manuscript. 
McHugh, C. (,/0f). “A^itudinal Control.” Synthese 01b: ,,fb_–Z,. 
McKenna, M. (,/0,). Conversation and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. (,//-). “Pu^ing the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility.” Philosophical 
Studies 0V1: ,1–Vf. 
Menges, L. (,/0f). “The Emotion Account of Blame.” Philosophical Studies 0fb: ,_f–fV. 
 39 
Mikula, G. (01-Z). “The Experience of Injustice: Toward a Be^er Understanding of its 
Phenomenology.” In H. W. Bierhoﬀ, R. L. Cohen, and J. Greenberg (eds.), Justice in Social 
Relations, pp. 0/V–,b. New York: Plenum. 
Mill, J. S. (0110). [0-Z0]. Utilitarianism. Reprinted in J. M. Robson (ed.), Collected Works of John 
Stuart Mill, Vol. 0/, pp. ,/V–_1. London: Routledge. 
Morris, H. (01fZ). On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Murphy, J. (,//_). GeCing Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Na’aman, O. (forthcoming). “The Rationality of Emotional Change: Toward a Process View.” 
Noûs.  
Nelissen, R. M. A. (,/0,). “Guilt-Induced Self-Punishment as a Sign of Remorse.” Social 
Psychological and Personality Science V: 0V1–bb. 
Nelissen, R. M. A. and M. Zeelenberg (,//1). “When Guilt Evokes Self-Punishment: Evidence 
for the Existence of a Dobby Eﬀect.” Emotion 1: 00-–,,. 
Nelkin, D. K. (,/01). “Guilt, Grief, and the Good.” Social Philosophy and Policy VZ: 0fV–10. 
———. (,/0f). “Blame.” In K. Timpe, M. Griﬃth, and N. Levy (eds.), The Routledge Companion to 
Free Will, pp. Vfb–--. New York: Routledge. 
Niedenthal, P. M., J. P. Tangney, and I. Gavanski (011b). “’If Only I Weren’t’ versus ‘If Only I 
Hadn’t’: Distinguishing Shame and Guilt in Counterfactual Thinking.” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology Zf: _-_–1_. 
No^lemann, N. (,//f). Blameworthy Belief. A Study in Epistemic Deontologism. Dordrecht, 
Netherlands. Springer.    
Ortony, A., G. L. Clore, and A. Collins (01--). The Cognitive Structure of Emotions. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 40 
Ohtsubo, Y., M. Matsunaga, A. Komiya, H. Tanaka, N. Mifune, and A. Yagi (,/0b). “Oxytocin 
Receptor Gene (OXTR) Polymorphism and Self-Punishment after an Unintentional 
Transgression.” Personality and Individual Diﬀerences Z1: 0-,–-Z. 
Peels, R. (,/0Z). Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Pickard, H. (,/0V). “Irrational blame.” Analysis fV: Z0V–,Z. 
Polger, T. W. (,/01). “Functionalism.” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN ,0Z0-///,, 
h^ps://www.iep.utm.edu/. Accessed on May ,0, ,/01. 
Portmore, D. W. (,/01a). “Control, A^itudes, and Accountability.” In D. Shoemaker (ed.), 
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. Z, pp. f–V,. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.   
———. (,/01b). Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options. New York: Oxford University Press.  
———. (,/01c). “Desert, Control, and Moral Responsibility.” Acta Analytica Vb: b/f–,Z. 
Prinz J. J. and S. Nichols (,/0/). “Moral Emotions.” In J. M. Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology 
Handbook, pp. 000–bZ. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Reis-Dennis, S. (,/01). “Anger: Scary Good.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1f: b_0–Zb. 
Scanlon, T. M. (,/0V). “Interpreting Blame.” In D. J, and N. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature 
and Norms, pp. -b–11. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. (,//-). Moral Dimensions. Meaning, Permissibility and Blame. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Shaver, P., J. Schwar~, D. Kirson, and C. O’Connor (01-f). “Emotion Knowledge: Further 
Exploration of a Prototype Approach.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology _,: 0,/Z0–
-Z. 
Sher, G. (,//Z). In Praise of Blame. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 41 
Shoemaker, D. (,/01). “The Trials and Tribulations of Tom Brady: Self-Blame, Self-Talk, Self-
Flagellation.” Draft of October 00, ,/01. h^ps://www.dropbox.com/s/slfyfuVerv0vvlw/Self-
Blame%,-Shoemaker%,1.pdf?dl=/  
———. (,/0_). Responsibility from the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
———. (,/0V). “Blame and Punishment.” In D. J, and N. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and 
Norms, pp. 0//–0-. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Shoemaker, D. and M. Vargas (forthcoming). “Moral Torch Fishing: A Signaling Theory of 
Blame.” Noûs.  
Smith, A. M. (,/0_). “A^itudes, Tracing, and Control.” Journal of Applied Philosophy V,: 00_–V,. 
———. (,/0V). “Moral Blame and Moral Protest.” In D. J, and N. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its 
Nature and Norms, pp. ,f–b-. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Tanaka, H., A. Yagi, A. Komiya, N. Mifune, and Y. Ohtsubo (,/0_). “Shame-Prone People Are 
More Likely to Punish Themselves: A Test of the Reputation-Maintenance Explanation for 
Self-Punishment.” Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences 1: 0–f. 
Tangney, J. P. and R. L. Dearing (,//,). Shame and guilt. New York: Guilford. 
Tierney, H. (forthcoming). “Guilty Confessions.” In D. Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency 
and Responsibility, Vol. f. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tracy, J. L. and R. W. Robins (,//Z). “Appraisal Antecedents of Shame and Guilt: Support for a 
Theoretical Model.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin V,: 0,VV1–_0. 
h^ps://doi.org/0/.00ff//0bZ0Zf,/Z,1/,0,. 
Vargas, M. (,//_). “The Trouble with Tracing.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy ,1: ,Z1–1/. 
Velleman, J. D. (,//V). “Don't Worry, Feel Guilty Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement _,: 
,V_–b-. 
Wallace, R. J. (011b). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.  
 42 
Watanabe, E. and Y. Ohtsubo (,/0,). “Costly apology and self-punishment after an 
unintentional transgression.” Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 0/: -f–0/_. 
Wi^genstein, L. (01_V). Philosophical Investigations. G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds.), G. E. 
M. Anscombe (trans.). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Wolf, S. (,/00). “Blame Italian Style.” In R. J. Wallace, R. Kumar, and S. R. Freeman (eds.), 
Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, pp. VV,–bf. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Young, L., S. Nichols, and R. Saxe. (,/0/). “Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of 
Moral Luck: It’s Not What You Do but What You Know.” Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology 0: VVV–b1. 
Zeelenberg, M. and S. M. Breugelmans (,//-). “The Role of Interpersonal Harm in 
Distinguishing Regret From Guilt.” Emotion -: _-1–1Z. 
Zhu R., X. Shen, H. Tang, P. Ye, H. Wang, X. Mai, and C. Liu (,/0f). “Self-Punishment Promotes 
Forgiveness in the Direct and Indirect Reciprocity Contexts.” Psychological reports 0,/: b/-–
,,. 
Zimmerman, M. J. (01--). An Essay on Moral Responsibility. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Li^leﬁeld.  
———. (01-f). “Luck and Moral Responsibility.” Ethics 1f: Vfb–-Z. 
 
 
 
 
